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Abstract. Designing for continuous interaction requires
designers to consider the way in which human users can
perceive and evaluate an artefact’s observable behaviour,
in order to make inferences about its state and plan, and
execute their own continuous behaviour. Understanding
the human point of view in continuous interaction re-
quires an understanding of human causal reasoning, of
the way in which humans perceive and structure the
world, and of human cognition. We present a framework
for representing human cognition, and show brieﬂy how it
relates to the analysis of structure in continuous interac-
tion, and the ways in which it may be applied in design.
Keywords: Cognition – Design – Models – Interaction –
Structure
1 Introduction
Designing an artefact that uses a continuous interaction
technique is diﬃcult because every continuous interaction
involves at least two entities, and we only have the free-
dom to design one of these. The same, of course, can be
said for the more conventional forms of human computer
interaction, in which a computer and a human take turns
to exchange information, but in a continuous interaction
the diﬃculty is compounded by the fact that the ex-
change of information can be simultaneous, and that the
use or meaning of the information being exchanged de-
pends upon the states of both of the interacting entities.
As we will conclude in this paper, it is actually necessary
to be able to model the conjoint state of the communicat-
ing parties as a single system in order to fully understand
a continuous interaction; and this requires the designer to
be able to model the mind and cognitive processes of the
human as well as the states and processes of the artefact.
From the point of view of humans, a continuous inter-
action is one in which they can observe the behaviour of
the artefact, can make inferences about its state, and the
state of any tasks that they are executing, and crucially,
can issue commands to the artefact or makemodiﬁcations
to the task environment at any point, without needing to
enter into any preparatory or enabling tasks to prepare
the artefact to receive their communication. They might
not be aware of it, but for the artefact to be able to re-
spond to their communication, it is also able to observe
their behaviour, and has to make inferences about their
state, and the state of the tasks. In essence, a continuous
interaction can be thought of as a dyadic communication
between two ‘minds’, both continually and actively up-
dating their models of each other and the world.
This is exactly what two humans do when communi-
cating. Therefore, a great deal of the psychological know-
ledge that we have about human communication can
be used to make inferences about continuous interaction
technologies. Grice’s principles of communication, for ex-
ample [8], may be used to form analogous design prin-
ciples, so that any change in the observable state of the
artefact conveys useful information, and that information
is not withheld (i.e. it is always potentially observable).
Design principles are a helpful way of codifying know-
ledge in a form that is easily accessible, but they can
be too abstract and general to be of more than guid-
ing help: the principle may tell designers that informa-
tion must be observable, but it does not help them to
choose how it should be presented. As in human–human
communication, nonverbal channels are also available to
support, modify and even supplant linguistic exchanges.
Again, there is a wealth of psychological knowledge about
how people use nonverbal communication, but this is less
readily transferable to the HCI arena, because the out-
put modalities available to the artefact diﬀer to those
available to humans. Principles about the timing of ob-
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servable events in speech and non-speech channels might
be derived (i.e. that the non-speech events should slightly
precede the speech event, so that they can set the context
for the semantic evaluation of the speech), but transfer of
knowledge becomes much harder, and is based on much
less sound foundations.
Instead of attempting to directly transfer know-
ledge from one domain to another, we have argued else-
where [12] that it is more helpful to induce an abstract
theoretical understanding of the ﬁrst domain, and to use
this to deduce knowledge of the new domain. This is
because the scope of the HCI domain is unpredictable,
continually changing and expanding. Thus, instead of
providing designers with concrete guidelines, we should
seek to provide them with a theoretical model that they
can apply in their own particular circumstances, to an-
swer questions that no one before has realised needed to
be asked. Speciﬁcally, we need to provide them with a way
of thinking about the human mind, and about how it
can deal with continuously available information streams,
both on the input and output sides.
2 Examples of continuous interaction
Continuous interaction is not a completely novel domain.
We have mentioned human-human communication as an
example of an area where existing knowledge is available,
but technological parallels are also available, even if they
are simpler than the problems that we expect to con-
front us in the future. Consider the familiar problem of
driving: although modern cars are actually also computer
controlled devices, earlier purely mechanical models pro-
vided the basis for considerable psychological research
on account of the amount of rapidly changing informa-
tion continually available to the human both from the
environment and the artefact (that is, the car). While
driving, drivers must monitor dynamic visual, auditory
and haptic information streams, continually predict fu-
ture events, and plan and execute their control of the arte-
fact. Crucially, they need to take the state of the car into
account in their planning. Reducing or increasing speed is
not just a matter of depressing the accelerator pedal: the
result depends upon the current gear and the engine revo-
lutions, and upon the torque of the engine. It may instead
be necessary to change gear up or down to change speed.
This information is available haptically (through the felt
position of the gear stick), through auditory information
(the sound of the engine), and may also be ‘in the head’ of
the driver as a known fact (i.e. in their model of the cur-
rent state of the car, and their knowledge of how the car
has responded in similar previous contexts). This is not
just the case for manual shift cars. In an automatic car,
hearing the sound of the engine helps the driver to predict
that pressing the accelerator may lead the car to change
gear rather than simply speed up, and the drivermay thus
change the timing and degree of their pedal depression.
In this case, we are reaching a scenario more similar to
those in the computing domain, i.e. we now have an arte-
fact that is modifying its own state, if not attempting to
modify the state of its user.
Identifying these sources of information helps us as an-
alysts to reason about the way that they can be combined,
about the relative accuracy and usefulness of the informa-
tion streams, and about likely sources of error, both on
the part of the human, and at the level of the human-car
pair (i.e. when neither does anything especially ‘wrong’,
but there is amisunderstanding ormiscommunication due
to ambiguity). We can also start to reason about the way
that people learn to use continuous interaction technolo-
gies, because the human behaviour in the car driving sce-
nario becomes completely proceduralised and automated,
and ‘just happens’ without our being consciously aware
of modifying our commands to the car, or even of having
made commands. We simply drive, and hold conversa-
tions, and listen to the radio, and think about other things.
An important lesson to be learnt from the analogy be-
tween the car example and interface design is that the car
designer cannot ignore the usability aspects of their de-
sign by arguing that humans are good at learning and can
simply be told how their car works. The explicit know-
ledge that drivers have of the cues they use, and of the
compensating actions they take, is very limited, and of-
ten incorrect. Yet at some level people do know how to
drive. This level of knowledge cannot be acquired verbally
as a set of semantic propositions, but must be acquired
through the same mental processes that will actually be
used in driving. There is only one way to do this, and
so learning to drive a car necessarily involves real driv-
ing, not just reading a manual, or being told how to do
it. Learning to use a continuous interaction device will
presumably be similar, and so the artefacts need to be
designed to be learnable through use. The psychologi-
cal contribution to solving design problems is to provide
a way of reasoning about how people learn.
Whenever people need to learn or understand the con-
sequences of their actions or the outcomes of another
entity’s behaviour, they use causal induction. Since an in-
teraction is the mutual exchange of information between
two or more participants, with the important connotation
that the information output of one partner serves as input
for another partner; the behaviour of one entity (taken to-
gether with the background against which the interaction
takes place) thus determines the behaviour of another en-
tity. In other words, these two behaviours are causally
related. In continuous interaction, the match between the
human’s action and the artefact’s response may be much
less deterministic than in more conventional interfaces,
because it is based on (fallible) inferences the artefact
draws about the entities and actions involved in the in-
teraction. Likewise, the human’s action may be much less
well deﬁned, because usually there are several means to
an end, and the one a user may choose, and its manner of
execution, will depend upon the context.
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As a concrete scenario, consider an intelligent white-
board, which uses a video camera to observe a human
making gestures in front of a projection screen on which
a computer generated image is projected. When the hu-
man makes a particular ‘writing’ gesture, the software
displays a cursor on the screen; when the human then
makes an arc through the air, close to the surface of
the projection screen, the software ‘draws a line’ on the
image. Then, the human makes a ‘grasp’ gesture, and the
software ‘selects’ the nearest object. Prototypes of simi-
lar systems can be found in many research labs [2, 3]. To
work well, the software has to recognise gestures from
a video source, and has to identify, from a continuous
stream of input, discrete points in time at which gestures
start and end. The human will perform the gesture dif-
ferently at diﬀerent screen positions, and so this must
be taken into account. There will be parallax problems
in deciding which screen position the human intends to
indicate, because the human is not physically touching
the screen, but gesturing in the air some distance above
it, and the human and the video camera are viewing
the screen from diﬀerent positions. There will be timing
problems, because even short delays between the human
forming a gesture and the software responding with the
appropriate cursor may lead the human to infer that the
gesture has not been recognised. Consequently, the hand
is dropped by the human and the gesture is reformed.
However, the device was actually in the process of recog-
nising the gesture, and the software was about to enter
‘line drawing’ mode; the repeated eﬀort of the user to
form the gesture thus produces a line following their hand
as they drop it. In selecting an object, the software may
have to interpret the image, perhaps using some inter-
action history or geon-based recognition algorithms, to
decide which elements the human wants to select, and
which are background. All of these aspects of the inter-
action (timing, extent, range, feedback) impact upon the
attribution of ‘intent’ to the human by the computer, and
upon ‘comprehension’ of the computer by the human. In
causal terms, the computer has to recognise a potential
cause from the background noise, and identify its refer-
ents, while humans have to identify possible eﬀects of
their actions and to determine the power that their ac-
tions have to cause events.
3 Continuity of structure, not events
If a device is to reason about an interaction in the same
way as its user, or at least, to come to the same conclu-
sions as its user, then it is necessary to develop a theoret-
ical model of the way that humans perceive and structure
the event streams that are available to them. To do this,
we need to deﬁne continuity and how humans perceive
it, and to model the information ﬂow available in a par-
ticular scenario to see how the human will be able to
process it. In this section, we show that continuity resides
at a structural level within a stream of information, and
not at the level of the event. In the next section, we sum-
marise a psychological model of information ﬂow that can
be used to model the cognitive activity involved in contin-
uous interaction.
Continuity cannot be identiﬁed at the level of events,
because the context within which an information stream
is being used determines the way that the human will
perceive it. A stream of information may be perceived as
continuous or discontinuous, depending upon the state of
the human and the task being performed. Events, and
therefore interactions, possess a hierarchical and parto-
nomic structure [15]: Zacks and Tversky demonstrated
through an experiment that humans are able, when ob-
serving events, to partition or unitise the event stream
into ‘meaningful units’. Participants had to view video-
tapes of persons engaged in certain activities (e.g. water-
ing plants) and had to press a button every time they
thought a meaningful component (e.g. retrieving the wa-
tering can from a cupboard) ended, and a new one be-
gan. Moreover, when the subjects were instructed to form
small or large units, the boundaries of large units coin-
cided with small unit breakpoints, reﬂecting the hierarch-
ical structure of the perceived events. An interaction can
therefore be conceptualised at diﬀerent levels of granu-
larity, or hierarchy. For example, ‘Writing a bullet list in
a word processor’ would characterise the general task at
a very high level. ‘Writing a bullet list’ of course consists
of ‘Starting the List/setting a list distinction’, ‘Entering
the ﬁrst item’, ‘Flushing to the next line’, ‘Entering the
second item’, and so on, until one ‘Ends the List’. Ei-
ther of these events can again be partitioned into yet ﬁner
details, like ‘Moving the middle ﬁnger of the left hand
over the e key’, ‘Pressing down the middle ﬁnger of the
left hand’, ‘lifting the middle ﬁnger of the left hand’, and
so on. Psychological research addresses how humans per-
ceive and communicate structure in events. Of course, the
description of hierarchical structure in events and inter-
actions can also be implemented in an artiﬁcial system.
A computer (or any other device) can be programmed to
analogously ‘conceptualise’ interactions in a hierarchical,
partonomic manner. In fact, as we will argue below, to
achieve a continuous interaction (from the user’s point of
view), it is necessary for the system to encode or represent
interactions in the same hierarchical manner as the user.
3.1 The layered description schema
All hierarchical task decompositions will have at the top
level a representation of the overall task, and at the low-
est level some representation of atomic events. The ﬁrst
problem is how low level that lowest level needs to be,
and what (if anything) needs to come in between. Only
then can the issue of identifying the partonomic structure
within each level be addressed.
In the TACIT project [7], we deﬁned a hierarchical
layered schema consisting of three levels of description,
MS ID: UAIS0026
9 April 2002 14:15 CET
4 J. May, M.J. Buehner and D. Duke: Continuity in cognition
the Task/Semantic/Context layer, the Perception/Evalu-
ation layer, and Physical Representation/Device layer
(for other purposes, the latter two layers can both be sub-
divided into two layers, giving a ﬁve layer schema, but the
three layer schema is suﬃcient for our purposes in this
description). Events, actions and, most importantly for
our purposes here, interactions, can be conceptualised at
each level of description.We will introduce the psycholog-
ical aspects of each layer of description, and subsequently
discuss implications and consequences arising from pro-
cessing at each given level:
– Task Layer. This is the highest andmost abstract level
in the hierarchy. It represents the overall goal and
broad context of an action or event. ‘Writing a bullet
list’ would be represented on this level. The task layer
provides the general structure of the interaction and
speciﬁes its constituent subunits or sub-events.
– Perceptual/Evaluative Layer. These subunits or sub-
events are meaningful and distinguishable parts of the
overall interaction. At the perceptual/evaluative level,
the execution and perception of these subunits, as well
as the evaluation of their outcome, takes place. ‘Flush-
ing to the next line’ belongs here. Subunits or sub-
events consist of physical details or atomic units, rep-
resented in the lower physical representation/device
layer.
– Physical Representation/Device Layer. This com-
prises the lowest level of representation. At this level,
one looks at the ﬁne physical details or atomic units
that make up the sub-events of an interaction, e.g. the
exact timing and force of key-presses. In our example,
‘Lifting the ﬁnger’ belongs to this level.
3.2 Action identiﬁcation theory
While the idea of representing an interaction at diﬀer-
ent levels of granularity is intuitively appealing, it is
of little help unless one speciﬁes determinants of when
and how higher or lower levels of representation should
be adopted. Vallacher and Wegner [14] suggest three
principles for action identiﬁcation with respect to a hier-
archical, layered action structure. First, an interaction
‘is maintained with respect to its prepotent identity’
(p. 4): a person can simply ‘press the return key’, ‘end
an entry and move to the next item in the list’ or ‘write
a bullet list’. The prepotent identity is the frame of
reference one adopts while performing an action, and
against which one monitors success or progress. Sec-
ondly, when both a lower and higher level representation
of an action are available, the higher level representa-
tion tends to become prepotent: ‘The idea here is simply
that people are always sensitive to the larger mean-
ings, eﬀects and implications of what they are doing’
(p. 5). Thirdly, ‘When an action cannot be maintained
in terms of its prepotent identity, there is a tendency
for a lower level identity to become prepotent. The idea
here is simply that people must sometimes concern them-
selves with the how-to aspects of action to perform the
action’ (p. 5). Someone might want to ‘Write a bullet
list’, but unless the diﬀerent sub-events comprising this
task are automated, it is necessary to consciously plan
to ‘Start the list in a new line’, ‘Activate list mode’ and
‘Enter the ﬁrst item’. In addition to these three prin-
ciples, the context and diﬃculty of the action, as well
as experience, determine the level of identiﬁcation or
representation.
It is useful to illustrate the operation of these three
principles on another, diﬀerent, computer-human-inter-
action context: a person navigating the internet. The
person has a web-browser open and is currently look-
ing at a page containing hotel information for Cagliari,
a city in Sardinia. The page contains a short refer-
ence about the ancient culture of the island, and in-
cludes a ‘link’ to the city’s archaeological museum. Un-
less the person is a computer novice, bewildered about
the amazing powers of the internet, we can safely as-
sume that the prepotent identity at this point is ‘tak-
ing up information (about Cagliari) that is presented
on the screen’. If it were the case (as it often is with
badly written web-pages) that the page displays in a tiny
font on the screen, this identity could not be main-
tained. Instead, a lower level identity ‘trying to deci-
pher the small print without glueing the eyes to the
screen’ will now become prepotent. Rather than process-
ing the information presented on the screen, the user
could try and take actions to improve the readability of
the information (by changing the preferences) and sub-
sequently return to the higher identity. If that is not an
option, the user may be so focused on the deciphering
aspects of the task (‘trapped’ at the lower level), that
they fail to understand the information represented by
the text.
Let us now assume that the user clicked on the link
for the archaeological museum. The browser takes a long
time, nothing happens, and in the end the interface ap-
pears to be stalled. The course of action the user subse-
quently takes will be crucially dependent on the prepo-
tent level at which he or she identiﬁes the interaction. If
the lower level identity ‘struggling to make the browser
usable’ were prepotent, the user may well try again and
again to get the broken link to work by changing proxy
settings or manually changing the HTML reference. If the
identity were ‘gathering information for my trip to Sar-
dinia’, however, the user may revert to other options to
obtain the desired information, like picking up the tele-
phone and call the museum at the provided number, or
going to the library to check out a book about Sardinia.
Finally, if the user never was interested in detailed infor-
mation about Sardinia in the ﬁrst place, but was merely
navigating the web to check out potential holiday destina-
tions, the next course of action would be to try and access
another site containing information about another loca-
tion, say Corsica.
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3.3 Continuity in interaction
An interaction can well be continuous on one level, but
discontinuous on another. As a consequence, it is not self-
evident what exactly deﬁnes continuity. For example if
one sends a print job to the printer down the hall, gets
up from the terminal to walk down the hall and collects
the output, continuity of interaction at the lower, physi-
cal level, of abstraction is strongly disrupted, even though
the higher level task description is still continuous (e.g.
print document and post it to colleague). While walking
down the hall, the user can no longer monitor changes at
the terminal (such as alert dialogs warning that the paper
tray is empty), and the system no longer has any infor-
mation about what the user is doing. If the system did
assume that the interaction had become discontinuous
(maybe the user has gone for lunch andwill not collect the
output for an hour or two, so the printer could print some-
thing else ﬁrst), and chose to perform other tasks instead
of printing the output, or if the paper ran out and print-
ing was paused until a button was clicked on the terminal,
the user would reach the printer and wonder where their
printing had gone. After waiting a while, the user would
have to go back and (frustratedly) try to recover the situ-
ation. For the user, the task had been continuous, even
though interaction was not taking place at a device level.
The system has to recognise continuity in users’ task level
structures, and not to rely upon device level continuity.
In light of the hierarchical structure of interactions,
we propose the following deﬁnition of continuity in inter-
action: an interaction is continuous if the perceptual and
conceptual structure of the interaction match. The per-
ceptual structure refers to the feedback stream an inter-
action participant receives (both internal and external).
The conceptual structure comprises plans and expecta-
tions that guide or drive the interaction. Both perceptual
and conceptual structures are hierarchical and can be
represented at diﬀerent levels, as outlined above. At the
task level, a computer user might have the general con-
cept of ‘writing a bullet list’, and as long as high-level
perception conﬁrms that this is what is being done, the
interaction is continuous. If, however, the task of ‘writ-
ing a bullet list’ is not suﬃciently automated, the middle
perceptual/evaluative layer becomes prepotent, and the
focus switches to smaller units of the perceptual and con-
ceptual structure. Now the user might, for example, be
conceptually ‘Entering the ﬁrst item’, and would also like
to ‘insert a line break within this ﬁrst item’. ‘Pressing the
return key’ is the relevant physical action on the device
level to implement this subgoal. However, the word pro-
cessor interprets the physical action ’press return key’ as
‘ﬁnishing the ﬁrst item and moving to the second item’:
the conﬁguration of the perceptual structure, namely
feedback about a bullet for the second item in the new
line, does not match the conceptual structure of ‘Entering
the ﬁrst item’ anymore. The conceptual and perceptual
structure of the physical action ‘press return key’, how-
ever, still match, since the action ‘press return key’ indeed
was successfully executed on a physical/device level. Had
the return key been defective, or had the user erroneously
hit a wrong key, then percept and concept would not have
matched on the physical level.
In the above analysis of the simple bullet list example,
the interaction is continuous on the task level (from a dis-
interested observer’s perspective the user never did any-
thing else but enter a bullet list), but discontinuous on the
perceptual/evaluative layer (the concept ‘inserting a line
break within the ﬁrst item’ did not match the percept of
‘ready to insert second item’), and again continuous on
the physical/device level the (conceptual and perceptual
structure of ’pressing return key’ are matched).
To successfully develop continuous interaction tech-
niques, it is not only necessary to identify the hierarchical
structure of the interaction, but also to predict which
level of representation will be prepotent for a participant
at a given point in time. Continuity can be established
by matching perceptual and conceptual structure at the
relevant level of representation.
4 Structures in mental representations
Now that a working deﬁnition of continuity has been ob-
tained, based upon the hierarchical and partonomic task
decompositions, we need a psychological model that is
capable of representing human perceptual and concep-
tual processing, so that continuities and discontinuities in
structure can be identiﬁed.
Our approach to modelling structure and cognition is
constructed within Barnard’s Interacting Cognitive Sub-
systems (ICS) framework [1]. ICS allows the construc-
tion of approximate models of cognition which, without
needing to model the exact nature of the transformations
of information involved in any particular situation, can
provide parameterised descriptions of the complexity of
the cognitive activity that is required. The ICS frame-
work (see Fig. 1) represents human cognition as a se-
quence of transformations of information from incoming
sensory representations, through a number of ‘central’
mental representations, allowing the production of ‘eﬀec-
tor’ representations that control overt behaviour (move-
ment, speech, etc.). The transformations are grouped into
‘subsystems’ that deal with particular forms of represen-
tation. There are three subsystems dealing with incom-
ing sensory representations (Acoustic, Visual and Body-
State), and four dealing with ‘central’ representations
(two ‘structural’ subsystems, Object and Morphonolexi-
cal; and two ‘meaning’ subsystems, Propositional and Im-
plicational). Two further subsystems (Articulatory and
Limb) transform ‘eﬀector’ representations into actions.
The sensory subsystems receive and structure informa-
tion coming from the external world (and the internal
bodily state) of the person. They derive more abstract in-
formation about the structure of the world, which forms
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morphonolexical
implicational
object
implicational
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hand
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viscera
Fig. 1. The overall ICS architecture, with a basic information ﬂow for visual perception, comprehension, and control of action indicated
by the arrows between subsystems
an input to Object and Morphonolexical subsystems, and
about its very high-level meaning, which is one of the
inputs to the Implicational subsystem. The Object and
Morphonolexical structural subsystems deal with the vi-
suospatial and auditory-temporal world, derive more ab-
stract semantic representations for the Propositional sub-
system, and prepare more detailed action representations
for the Limb and Articulatory subsystems to execute.
Finally, the Propositional and Implicational subsystems
work reciprocally to exchange and elaborate the semantic
and inferential meaning of the events being perceived and
processed by the cognitive architecture as a whole.
These levels of mental representation map onto the
three levels of analysis described in the previous section in
a straightforward manner. The Physical Representation/
Device Layer concerns information exchange with the ex-
ternal word, i.e. receiving sensory information from the
device and carrying out eﬀector information to act upon
the device. Representations of information concerning
this layer are thus held within the Acoustic, Visual and
Body-state subsystems for sensory input, and the Limb
and Articulatory subsystems for output from the human
to the device. The Perceptual/Evaluative Layer concerns
information abstracted from the sensory information, and
action goals that have not yet been decomposed into ac-
tual eﬀector actions. These are thus held at the Object
andMorphonolexical subsystems. Finally, the Task Layer
concerns the higher, and more abstract, level of compre-
hension of the events being perceived, and of the forma-
tion of goals to be achieved, and hence of the actions to be
carried out. This highest level is held at the Propositional
and Implicational levels.
Each of the subsystems is able to receive represen-
tations in its own speciﬁc format, to store them, and
to transform them into a limited number of other rep-
resentations, as noted in the descriptions above. As
a framework, the ICS perspective holds that a rich the-
oretical understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of
behaviour in complex tasks can be achieved by specifying
more detailed properties of the interactions between these
nine levels of mental representation, and by deﬁning how
speciﬁc interdependencies between them inﬂuence overt
behaviour.
In the case of the Intelligent Whiteboard scenario
mentioned as an example of continuous interaction de-
vices in Sect. 2, the user would be deep in an ongoing
task structure, talking to colleagues about something
complicated for which a diagram had previously been
drawn on the digital whiteboard. Most of what is con-
ventionally termed ‘thinking’ here occurs at the Propo-
sitional and Implicational levels. These are the levels
that allow the user to realise that the colleagues do not
grasp a certain point, and that in order to resolve this,
a part of the diagram needs to be altered. Having for-
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mulated a propositional Task Layer description in terms
of the changes ‘add an arrow to box B’, the Proposi-
tional to Object transformation process produces a spa-
tial representation of the actions to be carried out (at the
Perceptual/Evaluative Layer), and the Object to Limb
transformation process turns this into a series of eﬀector
representations (at the Physical Representation/Device
layer). In the course of executing the actions, the Vi-
sual and Body State subsystems monitor both the user’s
own actions (hand shape and position, both felt and
seen), their eﬀects in the world (the appearance of the
desired arrow, or undesired selection marquees or other
lines), and the changes in the observable state of the
Intelligent Whiteboard device (e.g. the cursor it might
display). These sensory inputs (again, at the Physical
representation/Device layer) are interpreted by trans-
formation processes that feed into (primarily) the Object
subsystem (for the Perceptual/Evaluative layer), where
blending with the downward propositional input allows
corrective eﬀector action to be generated, and thence to
the Propositional subsystem (for the Task Layer), so that
successive task steps can be controlled and coordinated
(or modiﬁed, if the Implicational subsystem detects con-
ﬂicts with the overall goal).
5 Changes in mental representation
To support the modelling required by the ICS theory, we
have developed a notational technique that enables de-
signers to detail the transitions in the topic of processing,
step by step. To introduce this notation, it is helpful to
think of a visual scene as a hierarchical structure, with
regions composed of groups of objects made up of parts.
Imagine walking through a door into an oﬃce. The oﬃce
is bounded by walls to the left and right, with a ceiling
above and a ﬂoor below. These regions provide limits to
the visual scene and each of them contains objects. You
can only ‘see’ the objects within a region if you are attend-
ing to that region. In front of you is a wall with a window,
through which some trees and a patch of sky is visible. To
the right of the window is a desk and chair, and on the
desk various stacks of paper, some open books, and a pad
of paper. A pen lies on the pad, and someone has been
drafting some text consisting of several lines of words.
The individual letters are not distinguishable from where
you stand.
Each of the decompositions mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraph has been illustrated in Fig. 2. The regions
of the scene that were not described in more detail have
had their composition left blank. The decompositions are
not strict ‘consists of’ relationships, since the ‘far wall’
does not consist of a desk and a chair, and the pad of
paper does not consist of a pen. They are intended to
illustrate the visual relationships between the elements
that will guide the dynamic changes in a person’s focus
of attention while looking around the room. To look at
office
word
tree
word word word word
lineline line
textpencil
pad stack of
paper
stack of
paper
book book
cloudtree
desk
window
chair
far wallleft wall floor right wallroof
Fig. 2. Hierarchical structure visible on walking into an oﬃce
the desk, it is necessary to look towards the far side of the
room. To look at the pad of paper, it is necessary to look
at the desk. To look at the words, it is necessary to look at
individual lines of text.
This account of attentional transition in ICS is couched
in terms of objects, not of visual features, and therefore
occurs at the Object level of representation. The elem-
ent focused upon after each of these transitions is trans-
formed into the topic of the object representation, by the
Visual to Object transformation process if the change is
driven by physical changes in the scene, or by the Propo-
sitional to Object process if the change is cognitively mo-
tivated. In an analogy to the concepts used in systemic
linguistics [9], this topic of processing can be thought of
as the psychological subject of the representation, with its
immediate context (the other elements within its super-
ordinate group) forming the psychological predicate. In
visual transitions that are controlled by the viewer while
looking around a scene, the transition can always be re-
lated to the preceding psychological subject, and so the
relationship between views is clear.
A dynamic search through this scene thus requires
the viewer to make a succession of transitions from an
element into its substructure. It is not possible to look in-
tentionally from the left wall to a speciﬁc word on the pad
in a single, directed glance. Successive attentional transi-
tions must take place either between elements within the
same level of structure (e.g. in this example, from one wall
to another, or to the roof or ﬂoor), up to the elements’ su-
perstructure or group (e.g. here from a wall to the oﬃce as
a whole) or down to the element’s constituent substruc-
ture (e.g. from the far wall to the desk or the window).
5.1 Transition path diagrams
Figure 3 illustrates these dynamic transitions in the no-
tational form that we have developed to aid computer
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chairdesk
stack of
paper
stack of
paper book book pencil textdesk
chairwindowfar
wall
tree cloud
window
stack of
paper
stack of
paper book book
pad
far
wall tree
cloud tree branch trunk branch
pad
desk
window
tree
group subject predicate constituents
Fig. 3. In looking around the oﬃce, a viewer canmake visual tran-
sitions between elements to change the psychological subject
of their object representation. These transitions can be be-
tween elements within the same level (row 2 to row 3),
or from one element to an element that is part of
its substructure (row 3 to row 4) or vice
versa (row 1 to row 2)
interface designers [1, 10, 13]. The rows of the notation
correspond to successive attentional ﬁxations upon a pro-
cessing topic (shown in a black frame), with the superor-
dinate grouping of that topic, its predicate and its con-
stituent structures detailed. The links between the rows
deﬁne the nature of the transition that occurs when the
topic changes: the U shows a transition ‘up’ to the su-
perordinate group; an inverted U a transition ‘down’ into
the substructure of the topic; and a bar a transition
‘sideways’ to one of the predicate elements (maintaining
the same superordinate, but creating a novel constituent
substructure).
In the top row, the viewer is looking at the pad of pa-
per that is lying on the desk. Then a transition ‘up’ the hi-
erarchy is made, and the desk becomes the psychological
subject. Note that this is a purely psychological transi-
tion; it does not require eye-movements. Next, the viewer
makes a ‘horizontal’ transition to look out of the window
– this might follow an eye movement, but note that the
change in gaze does not disturb the way that the elem-
ents are grouped. When the viewer is looking out of the
window, the constituents of the subject become two trees
and a cloud; and a transition ‘down’ the hierarchy can be
made to focus upon one of the trees. The linguistic use of
the concept of psychological subject and predicate [9] was
based on verbal discourse, not object based scenes, but
our extension of it parallels the need for the perceiver of
both to construct meaning from a perceptual structure,
and to derive a perceptual structure from sensory events
streams.
The notation shown in Fig. 3 is called a Transition
Path Diagram (TPD), and can be drawn for other levels
of mental representation. A Propositional TPD would re-
ﬂect the changes in psychological focus as a user moved
through diﬀerent steps of a hierarchical task structure,
indicating the movements from a task into its sub-tasks,
or up to the larger task. A Morphonolexical TPD would
show how a listener could attend to diﬀerent levels of
the structure of a sound stream, moving from the sound
of, for example, an orchestra performing a piece, to fo-
cus on the strings, and further to follow one part within
the string section. It can even represent the steps needed
for the listener to ‘restructure’ a series of sound events,
grouping them diﬀerently, by letting themmove up a level
and then back down, as Vallacher and Wegner [14] sug-
gested. The Object level TPD shown here uses a static
visual scene, for ease of explanation and presentation, but
it is intended to be useful for representing changing scenes
caused by the appearance or disappearance of objects,
their motion, or even the whole scene changing. Interest-
ingly, it also suggests that changes to objects that are
not the current psychological subject may not be read-
ily noticed, and so provides a way of allowing designers
to ensure that dynamic events intended to communicate
information to the user are actually seen, and also to
help them make changes without distracting the user.
Most powerfully, by constructing TPDs for several sub-
systems, the designer has a tool for coordinating in time
any changes in auditory and visual modalities, so that
they match changes in the user’s perception of the task.
5.2 Changes in level of representation
The TPDs have another potential use, which is to map
the changes in structure which occur when a represen-
tation at one level is transformed into another level, for
example from an Acoustic to a Morphonolexical repre-
sentation, or from a Propositional to an Object repre-
sentation. This is because, within ICS, transformations
between subsystems involve a move ‘up’ or ‘down’ in the
structure of the representation, as shown in Fig. 4.
Transformations ‘towards’ the centre of the model in-
volve a shift up in register, with the superordinate group
of the current psychological focus becoming the new psy-
chological focus, and its constituent structure becoming
lost. The transformation adds contextually relevant ba-
sic units into the predicate structure, and provides a new,
higher-order grouping element. So the Morphonolexical
A B B1 2 B3 B4 C C1 2 C3 C4 C5
B1 C C1 2 C3 C4 C5 D D1 2 D3
B1 C C3 2 C1 C4 C5 D D4 5 D6
A B B1 2 B3 B4 C C1 2 C3 C4 C5
1
2
Code X
Code Y
Code Y
Code Z
Fig. 4. A TPD showing the consequences of an elaboration trans-
formation from Code X ‘down’ to Code Y (adding a new set of
constituent elements, Dn), followed by a change of topic in
Code Y, and then an abstraction transformation ‘up’ to
Code Z (adding a novel grouping element A2)
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to Propositional transformation would make the word
that had been the Morphonolexical superordinate elem-
ent the new Propositional focus, with the phoneme that
had been the Morphonolexical focus (and its predicate
structure) becoming the word’s constituent structure.
The constituent structure of the phonemes would be lost,
and not represented at the Propositional level. Other
words, drawn from the recent context of Morphonolexi-
cal superordinates, would be used to form the Proposi-
tional predicate structure, and the transformation pro-
cess would derive a new super-ordinate element – in this
case, a phrasal unit. Transformations ‘away’ from the cen-
tre of the model perform the opposite functions, ’losing’
superordinate and predicate information from the source
representation, making the previous focus the new su-
perordinate element, and making its constituent struc-
ture the new focus and predicate structure. ‘Pragmatic’
rules depending upon the attributes of the source repre-
sentation govern the choice of which element within the
constituent structure becomes the new focus. Semantic
order is key in a Propositional to Morphonolexical trans-
formations, visual characteristics are key in Propositional
to Object transformations. Finally, new information is
added in by the transformation to provide the detailed
constituent structure of the new focus.
Understanding this process of abstraction and elab-
oration allows us to model the mappings between the
three layers of continuous interaction that were described
earlier. Moving from the Physical representation/Device
layer to the Perceptual/Event layer involves the loss of
detailed sensory information, and the addition of a group-
ing element that ‘makes sense’ of the information stream.
Moving up further to the Task layer involves losing more
detail about the events, but adds a grouping element
that represents the goal of the event stream. Moves in
the other direction lose the grouping elements, becom-
ing successively more detailed, until the eﬀector actions
are added and the behaviour can be carried out. A con-
crete example of the role of the diﬀerent levels of mental
representation in the detection of discontinuities is that
of the perception and comprehension of cinema ﬁlms. At
the lowest level, a cinema ﬁlm is a series of static images,
each projected for less than 40 milliseconds, with a brief
blackout between each image. At this level, the ﬁlm is
very discontinuous, and yet it is too fast for the human
sensory apparatus to detect, due to the well known phe-
nomenon of persistence of vision. This is an example of
a situation where what might be considered a discontin-
uous information stream is actually better considered as
a continuous stream, once the limitations of the receiv-
ing physical representation/device layer are taken into
account.
In an ICS analysis, then, the Visual subsystem will
receive a continuous stream of sensory information (at
the Physical Representation/Device layer), which it will
transform into an Object level representation (at the
Perceptual/Event layer). The stream of sensory infor-
mation is ‘chunked’ by the abstraction transformation
into objects with spatial characteristics and duration, and
a superordinate structure of their spatial interrelation-
ships is added, but the sensory details of the objects are
lost. Now, a new class of discontinuity may frequently
occur: cuts between diﬀerent camera positions during
a scene, and between diﬀerent scenes. These are discon-
tinuities at this level, because on such a cut the objects
that form the basis of the representation either change
position or size on the screen, or vanish altogether, being
replaced by new objects.
Moving up a layer in the analysis has changed the na-
ture of the information that is represented in the stream,
and hence the nature of the discontinuities. However, cuts
within a scene are rarely noticed (even though they may
happen as often as one per second), while cuts between
diﬀerent scenes almost always are. This suggests that the
prepotent identity does not reside at this level of analy-
sis, but at the upper Task layer, and indeed, in watching
a cinema ﬁlm the viewer’s task is to comprehend and un-
derstand the narrative, not to watch for the presence or
absence of particular objects. Moving from the Object to
the Propositional and Implicational levels of representa-
tion, we discard the details of the objects, and introduce
the semantic and inferential meanings about what those
objects are doing, and why. Changes in their apparent
screen position are not represented at this level, and so
these discontinuities no longer exist, and cannot be no-
ticed. Changes in their identity, or of their new super-
ordinate organisation (the scene), are represented, and
can be noticed as discontinuities (in fact, these are es-
sential to provide narrative information about the bor-
ders of units of meaning, and to evoke an implicational
representation of the pace of the narrative). Hence, end
of scene cuts, which signal to the viewer a change in
the characters and place and action, are noticeable; but
changes in camera position are not noticed – and neither
are continuity errors, unless one is speciﬁcally watching
for them. Evidence supporting this analysis comes from
studies that have shown that when people are actually
watching for within scene cuts, and so have their prepo-
tent identity shifted down to the Perceptual/Event layer,
they cannot later answer comprehension questions about
the narrative [11].
6 Strategies for application
The conceptual model of human cognition provided by
the ICS description of nine levels of mental representa-
tion, together with the TPD notation for representing
mental structure, forms a valuable tool for designers
who need to understand the human point of view in
continuous interaction. By constructing TPDs for the
cognitive activity required to sense, perceive and com-
prehend an observable information stream provided by
their artefact, designers can identify problems in the
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structure of the information that they are providing:
points where there is ambiguity in the possible grouping
structures as information is abstracted ‘up’ the hier-
archy; points where there is ambiguity in the possible
transitions within the predicate structure; points where
there is ambiguity in the transitions into the constituent
structure.
By plotting simultaneous TPDs for representations in
diﬀerent subsystems, designers can check that the events
being perceived by the user conform to the structure of
the task represented at the Propositional level, and that
multimodal streams of information are structured ap-
propriately for blending within the central subsystems.
The concept of prepotent identity of information can
also be understood within this framework: it is essen-
tially the level of mental representation at which the task
is being controlled. If information within the Proposi-
tional level is the key to performance, then the Task layer
becomes prepotent; if an aspect of the event stream (ei-
ther in the Object or Morphonolexical subsystems) is
key, then the Perceptual/Event layer is prepotent; and
if a sensory feature is key (at the sensory or eﬀector
subsystems) then the Physical Representation/Device
Layer is prepotent. Hence, a stream of information can
be ‘continuous’ at one level, but through the action
of transformation processes, may be ‘discontinuous’ at
another level (or vice versa). This support fulﬁls the
role of a problem solving method that we advocate as
a solution to the problem of HCI’s boundless domain.
By avoiding the need to encapsulate concrete design
advice as principles or guidelines, the abstract know-
ledge harvested from HCI research can be applied to
novel problems and contexts. The human user and their
cognitive architecture remains constant, however un-
expected the technological advances become. We can
go further than this, though. Because of the princi-
pled nature of the ICS theory, and the common ar-
chitecture shared by subsystems, the theory is well
suited for representation within a mathematical frame-
work. ICS allows the human cognitive architecture to be
seen as a set of quasi-independent ‘interactors’, which
exchange information with each other in predictable
ways. This is very similar to the way in which com-
puter scientists have come to view complex software
designs [4, 5].
By using a common language to represent the user
and system, the approach allows properties of interac-
tion to be described and understood in terms of the
conjoint behaviour of both agents. We use the term
syndetic model to describe this approach [6], to em-
phasise its bringing together of previously disparate
methodologies. The expressive power of mathematical
modelling means that a range of abstractions over hu-
man and device behaviour can be constructed and sit-
uated within the framework. Syndetic modelling is in-
tended to provide a single framework to represent the
behaviours of both cognitive and computational sys-
tems, therefore allowing both software and cognitive
perspectives to brought to bear on problems of inter-
action. In this way, the assumptions and insights of
both parties can be represented and considered ex-
plicitly. In both cases, observables are used to charac-
terise the intended behaviour of some system. Math-
ematical models are insensitive to whether their sub-
ject is computer software and hardware, or cognitive
resources, information ﬂow, and transformation. User
and system components both impose constraints on
the processing of information within the overall sys-
tem. Once both architectures have been represented
within the same mathematical model, it is possible to
logically ‘prove’ that certain consequences can or can-
not hold, or that certain other aspects must also be
present if both system and user are to reach the desired
states.
Identifying potential problems is only one aspect of
design, the real issue is how to address a problem once
identiﬁed. Syndetic models are important in this respect,
because they make explicit both the chain of reason-
ing that leads to problem identiﬁcation, and the funda-
mental principles or assumptions on which this chain is
grounded. In contrast, purely empirical approaches to
evaluation can identify that a problem exists, and may
localise the context in which it occurs, but without an ex-
plicit theory base they lack authority to state the cause of
the problem, and consequently do not in themselves pro-
vide help in identifying solutions. Of course, as a math-
ematical technique, syndetic modelling is probably not
going to be routinely used by designers: that is not its
place. It is more suited to the exploration, by skilled ana-
lysts, of novel application domains for which there is little
extant design knowledge or empirical evidence. In these
situations, the careful probing of the logic of interaction
can play a key role in directing prototyping and evalua-
tion towards critical areas, saving a great deal of time and
eﬀort.
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